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RECENT BOOKS
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Karl N. Llewellyn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. 539. $8.95.

When Karl Llewellyn rose to speak, the audience expected a good show.
That fired his boiler. Up from the smoke and roar leapt a shower of
sparkling ideas which his whole being joined in sending. He awed an
audience with brilliance, captivated it with personality, and always left
it better for having shared his wisdom and vision. 1
In Jurisprudence, his words are freed from the spell of showmanship.
Still they ring out loud and clear. He sets to work thinking on familiar
facts; pretty soon he finds a hub and begins to hammer in spokes with
examples, analogy and metaphor. A whole new scheme emerges in outline and structure, and we see the old and new and their relationship
as only a stretching of the mind can make us see.
Here then, no longer scattered through library stacks, is an unparalleled opportunity to view law and government up close and overall through
the keenest eyes of our time. This said, all that remains is to suggest how
you may read the book for deepest understanding, and what you will
better understand when you have read it.
With deference to the author's arrangement, and saving one exception,
I suggest that you read the book backwards. That is, begin with the last
chapter and wend your way toward chapter 1. Here's why:
A book is read with understanding when you "see," "hear," or say to
yourself pretty much the same thing as the author said, and for the same
reasons. 2 To do this you first identify the variables that controlled or
influenced the author. Then, by responding to instruction, recollection,
or manipulations (such as mental or penciled outlines and summaries) you
connect the author's conclusions and the evidence; his theory, its supports
and its applications. If as a result you could and might say the same thing
that the author has written (under similar conditions), then you understand what he has written.
The difficulty in reading Llewellyn with understanding is that he says
many original things, and it takes some doing for a reader to "say" them
for the same reasons as did Llewellyn. However, it is easier to respond with
understanding to the practical applications of his theory than to its philosophic justification because the applications occur in more familiar sur1 The late Professor Llewellyn was America's most stimulating law professor. He
taught at Yale, Columbia, and then Chicago. His major areas were Commercial Law,
Advocacy and Jurisprudence. He was chief draftsman of the Uniform Commercial
Code. He wrote numerous articles and his books include Bramble Bush (1930), an
explosive introduction to law for law students; The Cheyenne Way (1941), a study of
the resolution of problems by an informal system of law; and The Common Law
Tradition (1960), a magnificent exposition of the deciding of appeals and the crafts of
appellate judging and appellate advocacy.
2 Sec SKINNER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR 277-80 (1957).
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roundings. Therefore, since Jurisprudence concludes with applications of
realism, one should begin there and so shall this reviewer.
Llewellyn's concluding vignettes of Holmes,3 Pound, 4 and Hohfeldu
show that as a realist he admired men who understood law as a system
and who saw within it a continual reaction between tradition and the
changing needs of society. Llewellyn believed that these men gained their
up.derstanding from a wide sweep of learning coupled with sustained digging in detail. They maintained a true picture by continually reviewing
the system and each part's relation with each other part.
To identify the variables that are discovered by this mode of study
and which produce a realist's understanding of the legal system, it is
helpful to consider a specific social problem and the law's relation to it.
A good example is group prejudice, which for Llewellyn was a key problem. His analysis begins with the fact that "us-groups" from the immediate
family outward through kinfolk, school, church, etc., help channel energy
and develop people.6 However, an unfortunate by-product is prejudice
in favor of any "us-group" against all "others-groups." Llewellyn believed
there must ultimately be a wider unity-a "we-group" at least as broad
as the nation. The trouble is that people tend to accept members of "othersgroups" as individuals and not as members of that group. This process
can be countered by working with many others from many "others-groups"
and by good experience with any other group (such as often occurs in the
high schools and in the armed forces). Further, teachers can soften the
borders between "us-groups" and "others-groups" by pointing out at appropriate times while teaching literature, civics, history and the like that
"others" have troubles similar to ours, that they may be getting a distorted version of "us," that maybe we don't have all the facts either, and
that taking them one-for-one they are much like us.7
The law's institutions, symbols and machinery can join in the solution
of such a problem by guarding an ideal (e.g., human dignity) against
attack, and by setting up a certain degree of tension to achieve the ideal.8
Chapter 29, Holmes; and chapter 28, Mr. Justice Holmes.
Chapter 27, Roscoe Pound.
Chapter 26, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld-Teacher.
Chapter 22, Group Prejudice and Social Education.
Chapter 23, Yes, It Takes Mass Production. In this chapter Llewellyn moved
beyond the problem of inter-group harmony to the more general problem of educating all the citizens of a democracy for democracy. He believed that to achieve this
goal all children must learn the facts about political, social and economic matters
and form judgments on what to do and get done about them. To do this job well it
is necessary to mass produce good teachers. This, in tum, means that we need readily
acquired techniques and behavior patterns utilizable in routine fashion even by the
less expert teachers. As one example of such a technique, he suggested that teachers
should always preface "truth" with "X says that .•." so students will understand that
most facts come from authorities and the basic problem is to make a choice among the
opinions and solutions of authorities. He thought that use of the technique might
lead students to inquire why an authority says what he does.
8 Chapter 24, The Law, Human Dignity, and Human Civilization.
3
4
5
6
7
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Of course, it is difficult to know in advance how much tension is workable.
The practical challenge, Llewellyn tells us, is to devise measures in terms
of the particular problems posed by particular circumstances. For example,
in matters of racial prejudice, he would deal separately with hospitals,
hotels, restaurants, bars, beaches and schools.9
Thus did he recognize a need, when dealing with a social problem, to
view law as one of many means to achieve a purpose in and for a specific
kind of situation. He responded to this fact, as other realists have done,
by crystallizing a variable that powerfully affects one's understanding of
the legal system. One statement of it is this:
-"[F]or mass, as contrasted with individual, attempts at control, the
problem of law making and of law enforcement centers on informed,
sustained effort to find the particular persons whose conduct is concerned, and to devise means for affecting the conduct patterns of
those particular persons."1°
It follows that if legal rules are to be effective, they must follow the
lines of the social problem. We may tum to crime for an example. In
Llewellyn's opinion "theft of an automobile for temporary purposes" is
not a satisfactory legal concept because in terms of conduct there are three
varieties: the joy ride, theft for resale, or for use in crime. 11
Other unconventional classifications and insights emerge when, in
devising any legal measure for social control, attention is centered on behavior patterns and circumstances. Thus, says Llewellyn, one should ask
(I) whether a law aids an established folkway or attempts to change the
conduct of.members of a group, (2) whether it affects conduct in a group,
of a group, or between groups, (3) whether the activity is legitimate and
subject to regulation, or entirely unlawful, and (4) whether the group
activity is highly organized or not. Appropriate guides can be constructed
for the different patterns formed by answers to these inquiries. For instance, we may want to change the conduct of loosely organized groups
engaged in a legitimate activity that needs regulation (such as requiring
disclosure of the ingredients of packaged foods). Here, the problem is
education and devising ways of compliance that will not destroy the industry and will be reasonably uniform throughout the country.
The effectiveness of this behavioral approach is illustrated by the
New York statute which prohibits exhibition of a book for sale if it bears
a library stamp. Llewellyn recalls that librarians sent notice of the statute
to every second-hand book dealer. The market for stolen library books
became unprofitable; thefts decreased almost to nothingness. 12
9 Chapter 25, What Law Cannot Do For Inter-Racial Peace.
10 Chapter 18, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement at 399.
11 Chapter 19, Theft as a Behavior Problem.

12 Llewell)n deals with criminal procedure in chapter 21, The Anthropology of
Criminal Guilt. Here he concludes that the problem is one of producing the coincidence
of an individual's sense of guilt, and the group-feeling of guilt (which covers the groupimposed standard of guilt, a determination that the individual committed an offense,
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It should be clear by now that the hub of Llewellyn's jurisprudence
is not the rules of law, nor even the conduct of public officials. He is
concerned with the interrelationship between the behavior of public officials and the behavior of the public. Legal rules--even those working
rules which actually influence judicial decisions-do not adequately describe
this relationship or provide a basis for administering the system or understanding change. The scope of one's interest must broaden to civilization,
the total machinery which carries on society's work and traditions, and to
the institution of Law-Government.
The central aspect of Law-Government, as indeed of any institution,
is an activity organized around a job or group of jobs.1 3 The full picture
includes the going practices of the relevant specialists, the physical equipment, and the manner of organization. One must ask: what are (or should
be) the jobs of the institution? How are they best accomplished?
The jobs of Law-Government, as Llewellyn sees them, are (1) to maintain the groupness of society by clearing up trouble cases, by channeling
conduct to prevent or reduce the emergence of trouble cases, and by
creating new behavior appropriate to changed conditions, (2) to allot the
authoritative "say" and the manner of its saying in such matters, (3) to
elicit leadership and administration which will organize and direct the
team so as to produce an unfolding of constructive possibilities, and (4) to
develop, maintain, and better the craft know how of the craftsmen engaged
in jobs (1), (2), and (3).14
and fault in the offender, i.e., that he has the mental wherewithal to commit the
offense).
Llewellyn approved the ideals behind our system of criminal procedure-fair and full
notice of charges, time to prepare, right to appear and answer, right to a fair and
open-minded tribunal, to call witnesses, to a helper and spokesman who knows the
ropes, and to fair advance notice that an act may be a crime. However, he believed
that our adversary system of trial is sometimes form-ridden because the design of our
machinery for carrying out the ideals was strongly influenced by a distrust of officials.
Thus, the accused is dealt with at arm's length from the officials.
In simpler, primitive societies the criminal system is parental. Trial is not
adversary; criminal guilt must be a sense of guilt in the culprit, an active drive to
come back into society and do right-and he will be welcomed back in. There is a
minimum of form. These are good features, thought Llewellyn, but he observed that
the parental system can be abused to carry out personal grudges, to make corrupt
gain, or to put down political dissent.
Llewellyn hoped that we will be able to work out machinery to preserve the best
of both systems. He was encouraged by modem treatment procedures, juvenile courts,
grievance procedure in some labor discharge cases, and even from military law when
handled by an understanding C.O. He had hoped to work out this theme in greater
detail, as he explained in the Preface, giving detailed attention to the need for a
double standard of guilt: for the individual, one of complete personal responsibility;
for officials, as regards an actual or prospective offender, a standard dominated by
ideas of genetic and social conditioning.
Chapter 20, Who Are These Accused?, deals with the attitudes of the public toward
criminal procedure, and elaborates on the thesis that faith in our form of government
requires that a man whose views on government differ from our own should not more
quickly be believed guilty of a specific offense than one with whose views we agree.
13 Chapter 10, On the Nature qf an Institution.
14 Chapter 15, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology.
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Rules are important means by which the institution of Law-Government
gets jobs (I) and (2) accomplished. However, their doing depends far more
upon sound craftsmanship; hence, the vital importance of jobs (3) and
(4).
Since the concept of craftsmanship is not familiar to many lawyers,
it may be helpful to consider it in detail. A craft, according to Llewellyn,
is a recognizable line of work, practiced by recognized craftsmen. The
crafts of any institution must be understood and transmitted for the institution to retain its strength. If an institution's specialists, that is, its
craftsmen, study only its rules, and lose sight of skills, standards and
goals, the institution risks technical and moral decay. On the other hand,
to the extent that a craft-tradition is strong and soundly based, one can
expect the same kind of classification of situations from any trained
craftsman, and the same kind of reading and application of the rules.
To make this clear, let's take a specific example-Llewellyn's favorite
-the craftsmanship of appellate judges. He points out that rules are not
the only variables controlling judicial decision, nor are they the only
factors identified by judges as supporting their decisions. Instead, the
opinions of appellate courts in the United States today recognize the combined influence of Rules, Precedent, Reason (a desire to avoid injustice),
and Situation-Sense (an attempt to identify the kind of situation before
the court and what result makes sense for that kind of situation and for
the particular case). 15
The essence of the appellate judge's craft is an ability to harmonize
these variables in each case and thus accommodate tradition and the need
for change. In the early 1900's the style of deciding cases and writing
opinions was to emphasize Rules and Precedent. Today, however, the
courts are well on the way to recapturing what Llewellyn calls the Grand
Tradition of the Common Law. 16 In this period-style, the "Grand Style,"
found previously in the mid-1800's, courts give first attention and heaviest
weight to Situation-Sense and Reason. In the Grand Style, courts rework
the Rules each time they are applied, the better to achieve and express
their sense and reason. Thus, the basic rule for the craft of judging is
not to follow precedent, but rather to "keep in mind the reason for the
rule, to extend the rule as far as the reason extends, limit the rule where
the reason stops, and alter the rule when the reason is discovered to have
ceased or been mistaken ... :•11
This practical craft rule helps support a realist's understanding of the
legal system. When it is applied, judicial opinions are not formal deductions
from pre-established rules. To the contrary, like a realist's jurisprudence,
11:i This analysis is found throughout the book. See especially, chapter 12, American
Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy; chapter 8, On the Good, the True,
the Beautiful, in Law, 178-96; and chapter 4, Frank's Law and the Modern Mind. For
more detail, see LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON I.Aw TRADITION (1960).
16 Chapter 9, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition.
17 Chapter 6, Impressions of the Conference on Precedent at 117.
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they are "open, reasoned, extension, restriction or reshaping of the relevant rules, done in terms not of the equities or sense of the particular
case or of the particular parties, but instead (illuminated indeed by those
earthy particulars) done in terms of the sense and reason of some significantly seen type of Ii£e-situation." 1B
To the extent that the sense and reason of a rule takes over its shaping
and phrasing, the rule will not only have the potential power to stimulate
responses which deal effectively with a social problem, but also it will talk
alike to every craftsman who has been trained in and is responsive to that
style.
A lawyer must become responsive to the current style. If he does not,
and looks to opinions for their rules alone, failing to understand what was
helping and what was bothering the court, he will never know which rules
are working rules and which rules are merely paper rules, i.e., rules that
are outmoded and do not actually control or explain decisions. Further,
with only a surface reading of judicial opinions a lawyer cannot understand
the variables which will influence future development and application of
the rules. Thus, he could not become an effective counselor or advocate.19
Llewellyn finds no excuse for wearing blinders while reading cases.
He reminds us that the craft of appellate judging is easily studied because
the significant evidence is readily accessible to all who will look and see.
Further, this study is particularly important because by way of analogy,
contrast and background, study of the craft of appellate judging provides
an avenue to study of the less documented but no less important crafts
of the practicing lawyer (advocacy, counselling, drafting, negotiation), of
the trial judge (to whom the law tends to appear as an imperative), and
of the legislator (to whom law is a means to affect the behavior of other
persons).
Because craftsmanship is so essential to the institution of Law-Government, Llewellyn urged law schools to guarantee the minimum technical
proficiency of every graduate. The best means to insure good practical
training, he thought, was to teach law as a liberal art combining technical,
intellectual and spiritual training.2O
Thus, in addition to technical training in the skills of lawyering, each
law student should have intellectual training in the law's crafts, its purposes and effects. Llewellyn advised that to promote depth of learning,
students should study a series of judicial opinions on one topic from one
jurisdiction, with background material provided on society, the court,
the judges and the record. Breadth of learning could be promoted by
requiring outside reading not necessarily connected with any course. The
faculty should prepare reading lists and syllabi on the classics of law and
Chapter 9, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition at 219-20.
Chapter 14, The Modem Approach to Counselling and Advocacy. See also chapter
7, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence.
20 Chapter 17, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art.
18

10

1963]

RE.CENT BOOKS

625

on books which present information about the current state and past
achievements of law and lawyers.
The spiritual side of law is seen first in its esthetics-form suited to
function in advocacy, draftsmanship, judicial opinions, and the various
arts of action (such as trial presentation). Second, since Law-Government
is a great service institution, there is a need for study of the ideals to
which it is and should be directed (i.e., its jobs and what constitutes
their doing). Such ideals can be taught through discussion in , depth of
particular problems. Further, law teachers should not hesitate to preach
ideals; though of course they should not demand agreement or punish
dissent.
In the third year of law school, a course in jurisprudence should be
required.21 The course could emphasize any of the topics found in Jurisprudence, e.g., philosophy of law, the nature of law and justice, legal
method, the theory of legal institutions, the relations between law and
what it accomplishes, the life of Holmes, law and the social sciences, or
history read for its meaning. But whatever the central core, students
should be made to think about it, putting together around it what they
already know of law. The only essential subject matter is study of some
part of legal techniques (such as how appellate judges decide cases and
write opinions) and some study of the quest for justice.
Much of this vital subject matter is found in Jurisprudence. However, the book is far more than an aid to students. It is clear from what
has already been said that Llewellyn has a message for judges. And he
speaks also to practicing lawyers.22 First, he advised the bar to pay greater
heed to the law crafts. Second, he recommended that to further the quest
for justice, the practicing bar should adopt better business methods (so
as to lower the price of legal service), do a better job of letting the public
know about legal services, and create new procedures by which to bring
lawyers together with potential clients. Third, and most important, he
urged the bar to broaden its vision. The lawyer's basic craft, he postulated,
is doing and getting things done with the law-any kind of thing in
any field. 23 Thus, a lawyer's vision must be of the whole-of right and
justice-and not merely client service. Technique without ideals is a
menace, he said, just as ideals without technique are a mess. Thus, in the
practice, as in legal education, judicial decision, and in dealing with social
problems such as group prejudice and crime: "Vision and sense for the
Whole, and skills in finding ways, smoothing friction, handling men in
any situation, with speed, with sureness: these mark our best."24
The path to this broader vision-for students, judges and practicing
lawyers alike-is to approach law as a social science, as a matter of be.,
21
22
23
2t

Chapter 16, The Content of a Jurisprudence Course.
Chapter 11, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cu.res?
Chapter 13, The Crafts of Law Re-valued.
P. 822.
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havior to be seen, recorded and studied as we see and record the work of
men in industry. As Llewellyn said,
"A realistic understanding, possible only in terms of observable behavior, is again possible only in terms of study of the way in which
persons and institutions are organized in our society, and of the crossbearings of any particular part of law and of any particular part of
the social in the social organization." 25
To do this job well, Llewellyn tells us, an investigator must carry
problems through all the way, using the best available techniques.26 He
should narrow the focus of inquiry to particular parts of law and society.
He must seek all relevant observable data to add to his own experience
and common sense.
Llewellyn cautioned that certain pitfalls must be avoided when one
studies the details of law and society as a step toward understanding the
legal system.27 First, an investigator must be wary of the threat of the
available. We tend to rely heavily on the materials most readily available; but they may not be truly representative of the £acts. Second, there
is the threat from apparent simplicity. We have an urge to see things as
simple. We tend to see things as "either-or" and to arrive at a verbal
simplicity even though the facts are not simple. Third, there is a danger
in fusion and confusion of the realms of Is and Ought. It is true, of course,
that ideals and value judgments help set problems for inquiry, and recur
after the purely scientific problem has been solved as far as it can be
solved. In the meantime, however, we must distinguish £acts from evaluation, reform from observation, and rules of doing something (descriptive)
from rules for doing something (ideals).
Llewellyn also has some advice on very subtle aspects of investigation.
He first notes that for induction, data must be weighed and frozen into
one form; but we mustn't forget that it is not so fixed in nature. Second,
deduction is no better than the hypothetical with which it must begin
(i.e., if we deduce B from A, our conclusion is no stronger than the hypothetical "if A then B"). Further, he points out, unless you begin with an
adequate hypothesis, one with rigidly defined concepts, deduction can lead
somewhere only by accident. And, he concludes, "only the gift of posing
meaningful hypothesis leads anywhere." 28
I quite agree, and I submit that Professor Llewellyn's supreme gift
Chapter I, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step at 40.
Chapter 2, Some Realism about Realism.
27 Chapter 3, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A Realist's Critique.
In matters of method it appears that Llewellyn took the philosophic concepts most
frequently associated with John Dewey and applied them to jurisprudence. The result,
as in Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy, was (1) to break down traditional dichotomies
and create new, more inclusive generalizations which included the old, and (2) to shift
emphasis from the study of entities to the study of relationships and processes.
28 P. 94.
25

26
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was posing meaningful hypotheses. Thus, I have saved for last, and I suggest that you read last, the hypothesis which contained his broadest vision.
He had intended to work it out in detail and would like to have included
it in a pocket supplement to Jurisprudence. The subject was the quest for
Justice as affected by each quester's view and by scarcity.29 The hypothesis
cannot now become a supplement, but has been left to us for further
exploration. It is this:
"[W]hen it comes to ultimate substance of the Good, I repeat that
I can find no clarity, nor any conviction of reason or of deduction as
to specific matters, from the broad ultimates others have found clear.
I put my faith, rather, as to substance, in a means: In that on-going
process of effort to come closer to the Good, that on-going process
of check-up and correction, and further check-up and correction,
which is the method and the very life of case-law. 'Reason acting on
experience'-better: 'Reason at work upon experience, to find and
state explicit guidance for the future; Reason, responsibly and
explicitly accounting for why a rule or principle seems reasonable;
Reason, re-examining in the light of reasonableness, on further experience, any and every prior ruling or prior reason given, and then
reshaping, reformulating, redirecting, each time need may appear in
further reason.' That is the common law at its high best: the Grand
Style. Perhaps because I know nothing better, perhaps because Judicial Justice has been so much discussed, let me leave it at that. But
do not let me leave it at that without insisting that when law ceases
to be remote, when law comes home, then a process works out among
the citizenry of a democracy which is the exact analogue of the common law judicial sequence of self-correction, of judicial review of prior
judicial decision-which is, indeed, its twin and needed brother. . . .
"[F]aith in the essential method of the common-law tradition as that
tradition has stood in this country in its best years, and as it has come
to stand again-that faith opens a new grasp of our political philosophy. When individual citizens or officers in office, from whatever
sequence of divergent absolutes, come to cope as responsible c1t1zens
or officers with working out concrete 'applications' of their absolutes
to the problems of their fellows and themselves, answers are not to be
had by deduction, nor out of authority. As in the common law, the
new light of the fresh case recolors each problem of 'application.' One
does his best. But the knowledge that review impends from his successors, in the new light of a new fresh problem, must come to any officer
or citizen who thinks-new light, too, from a swing of administration,
built on other ultimates, or on other immediate views of wisdom. The
pragmatic way is no way to reach an ultimate or absolute, but it is
the only sound way to apply an ultimate, however reached. The finest
common law tradition sums up the manner in which the parties, the
211 Llewellyn noted in the Preface that the justified desires and demands of
people have always exceeded the wherewithal to fulfill them, and they always will.
One of the most important functions of civilization, he said (in chapter 24, The Law,
Human Dignity, and Human Civilization), was to provide the necessary surplus to permit
some degree of human dignity to be realized by all. In addition, our own variety of
civilization must refresh itself and leave some room for individuals to build themselves into different kinds of people.
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generations, the clashing groups of a democracy must work their
way to wisdom."30
I hope you are now ready and eager to take the book in hand and
join Professor Llewellyn in the search for a deeper understanding of law.
Perhaps you may even want to begin with page one.

Charles D. Kelso,
Associate Professor of Law,
Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis Division

so Chapter 8, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law at 211-13. Llewellyn's
reconciliation with those who seek absolutes is recorded in chapter 5, Natural Law
for Judges.
This broad vision also appeared in chapter 12, The American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy at 314-15, where, in regard to the possible danger of
irresponsible citizenry, he said:
"[A] craft-minded, craft-proud corps of administrative personnel, announcing policies
in advance, and both acting and feeling need to give reasons-life-reasons-in the
grander manner of the common law, offer a leverage both upon service-consumers and
upon legislators which holds workable possibility of meeting and countering the danger.
Such a pattern of personnel serves as a model of responsibility not only within but
without. It stirs confidence, and pride, and a different attitude toward 'the' government
at large, in any citizen who meets with it, anywhere. A citizen's general attitude toward
'government' builds importantly in terms of the contacts he has firsthand or has on close
hearsay with particular government officers. Let these be reasonable, and give intelligible
reasons, be firm, and insist on the citizen's reasonable participation where he has the
wherewithal to participate, and the citizen's responsible 'democratic' attitude is built••••
"From one end to the other of the problems of democracy, I thus submit that the
grander manner of the common law tradition offers a pattern and a method for effective work, plus a demonstration that even under adverse conditions such patterns
and methods can be made to spread on an effective mass or 'democratic' scale, and to
take hold, on an effective mass or 'democratic' scale, of the relevant citizen consumer and
participant."

